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Euthyphro: What's new, Socrates, to make you leave your usual haunts in the Lyceum and spend your time here by the king-archon's court? Surely you are not prosecuting anyone before the king-archon as I am?
Socrates: The Athenians do not call this a prosecution but an indictment, Euthyphro. Euthyphro: What is this you say? Someone must have indicted you, for you are not going to tell me that you have indicted someone else. Socrates: No indeed. Euthyphro: But someone else has indicted you? Socrates: Quite so. Euthyphro: Who is he? Socrates: I do not really know him myself, Eughyphro. He is apparently young and unknown. They call him Meletus, I believe. He belongs to the Pitthean deme, if you know anyone from that deme called Meletus, with long hair, not much of a beard, and a rather aquiline nose. Euthyphro: I don't know him, Socrates. What charge does he bring against you? Socrates: What charge? A not ignoble one I think, for it is no small thing for ayourng man to have knowledge of such an important subject. He says he knows how our young men are corrupted and who corrupts them. He is likely to be wise, and when he sees my ignorance corrupting his contemporaries, eh proceeds to accuse me to the city as to their mother. I think he is the only one of our public men to start out the right way, for it is right to care first that the young should be as good as possible, just as a good farmer is likely to take care of the young plants first, and of the others later. So, too, Meletus first gets rid of us who corrupt the young shoots, as he says, and then afterwards he will obviously take care of the older ones and become a source of great blessings for the city, as seems likely to happen to one who started out this way. Euthyphro: I could wish it were true, Socrates, but I fear the opposite may happen. He seems to me to start out by harming the very heart of the city by attempting to wrong you. Tell me, what does he say you do to corrupt the young? Socrates: Strange things, to hear him tell, for he says that I am a maker of gods, and on the ground that I create new gods while not believing in the old gods, he has indicted me for their sake, as he puts it. Euthyphro: I understand, Socrates. This is because you say that the divine sign keeps coming to you. So he has written this indictment against you as one who makes innovations in religious matters, and he comes to court to slander you, knowing that such things are easily misrepresented to the crowd. The same is true in my case. Whenever I speak of divine matters in the assembly and foretell the future, they laugh me down as if I were crazy; and yet I have foretold nothing that did not happen. Nevertheless, they envy all of us who do this. One need not worry about them, but meet them head-on. Socrates: My dear Euthyphro, to be laughed at does not matter perhaps, for the Athenians do not mind anyone they think clever, as long as he does not teach his own wisdom, but if they think that he makes others to be like himself they get angry, whether through envy, as you say, or for some other reason. Euthyphro: I have certainly no desire to test their feelings toward me in this matter. Socrates: Perhaps you seem to make yourself but rarely available, and not to be willing to teach your own wisdom, but I'm afraid that my liking for people makes them think that I pour our to anybody anything I have to say, not only without charging a fee but even glad to reward anyone who is willing to listen. If then they were intending to laugh at me, as you say they laugh at you, there would be nothing unpleasant in their spending their time in court laughing and jesting, but if they are going to be serious, the outcome is not clear except to your problems. Euthyphro: Perhaps it will come to nothing, Socrates, and you will fight your case as you think best, as I think I will mine. Socrates: What is your case, Euthyphro? Are you the defendant or the prosecutor? Euthyphro: The prosecutor. Socrates: Whom do you prosecute? Euthyphro: One whom I am thought crazy to prosecute. Socrates: Are you pursuing somone who will easily escape you? Euthyphro: Far from it for he is quite old. Socrates: Who is it? Euthyphro: My father. Socrates: My dear sir! Your own father? Euthyphro: Certainly. Socrates: What is the charge? What is the case about? Euthyphro: Murder, Socrates. Socrates: Good heavens! Certainly, Euthyphro, most men would not know how they could do this and be right. It is not the part of anyone to do this, but one who is far advanced in wisdom. Euthyphro: Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, that is so. Socrates: Is then the man your father killed one of your relatives? Or is that obvious, for your would not prosecute your father for the murder of a stranger. Euthyphro: It is ridiculous, Socrates, for you think that it makes any difference whether the victim is a stranger or a relative. One should only watch whether the killer acted justly or not; if he acted justly, let him go, but if not, one should prosecute, if, that is to say, the killer shares your hearth and table. The pollution is the same if you knowingly keep company with such a man and do not cleanse yourself and him by bringing him to justice. The victim was a dependent of mine, and when we were farming in Naxos he was a servant of ours. He killed one of our household slaves in drunken anger, so my father bound him hand and food and threw him in a ditch, then sent a man here to enquire from the priest what should be done. During that time he gave no thought or care to the bound man, as being a killer, and it was no matter if he died, which he did. Hunger and cold and his bonds caused his death before the messenger came back from the seer. Both my father and my other relatives are angry that I am prosecuting my father for murder on behalf of a murderer when he hadn't even killed him, they say, and even if he had, the dead mand does not deserve a thought, since he was a killer. For, they say, it is impious for a son to prosecute his father for murder. But their ideas of the divine attitude to piety and impiety are wrong, Socrates. Socrates: Whereas, by Zeuss, Euthyphro, you think that your knowledge of the divine, and of piety and impiety, is so accurate that, when those things happenedas you say, you have no fear of having acted impiously in bringing your father to trial? Euthyphro: I should be of no use, Socrates, and Euthyphro would not be superior to the majority of men, if I did not have accurate knowledge of all such things. Socrates: It is indeed most important, my admirable Euthyphro, that I should become your pupil, and as regards this indictment challenge Meletus about these very things and say to him: that in the past too I considered knowledge about the divine to be most important, and that now that he says that I am guilty of improvising and innovating about the gods I have become your pupil. I would say to him: "If, Meletus, you agree that Euthyphro is wise in these matters, consider me, too, to have the right beliefs and do not bring me to trial. If you do not think so, then prosecute that teacher of mine, not me, for corrupting the older men, me and his own father, by teaching me by exhorting me and punishing him." If he is not convinced, and does not discharge me or indict you instead of me, I shall repeat the same challenge in court. Euthyphro: Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, and, if he should try ot indict me, I think I would find his weak spots and the talk in court would be about him rather than about me. Socrates: It is because I realize this that I am eager to become your pupil, my dear friend. I know that other people as well as this Meletus do not even seem to notice you, whereas he sees me so sharply and clearly that he indicts me for ungodliness. So tell me now, by Zeus, what you just now maintained you clearly knew: what kind of thing do you say that godliness and ungodliness are, both as regards murder and other things; or is the pious not the same and alike in every action, and the impious the opposite of all that is pious and like itself, and everything that is to be impious presents us with one form or appearance in so far is it is impious? Euthyphro: Most certainly, Socrates. Socrates: Tell me then, what is the pious, and what the impious, do you say? Euthyphro: I say that the pious is to do what I am doing now, to prosecute the wrongdoer, be it about murder or temple robbery or anything else, whether the wrongdoer is your father or your mother or anyone else; not to prosecute is impious. And observe, Socrates, that I can quote the law as a great proof that this is so. I have already said to others that such actions are right, not to favor the ungodly, whoever they are. These people themselves believe that Zeus is the best and most just of the gods, yet they agree that he bound his father because he unjustly swallowed his sons, and that he in turn castrated his father for similar reasons. But they are angry with me because I am prosecuting my father for his wrongdoing. They contradict themselves in what they say about the gods and about me. Socrates: Indeed, Euthyphro, this is the reason why I am a defendant in the case, because I find it hard to accept things like that being said about the gods, and it is likely to be the reason why I shall be told I do wrong. Now, however, if you, who have full knowledge of such things, share their opinions, then we must agree with them too, it would seem. For what are we to say, we who agree that we ourselves have no knowledge of them? Tell me, by the god of friendship, do you really believe these things are true? Euthyphro: Yes, Socrates, and so are even more surprising things, of which the majority has no knowledge. Socrates: And do you believe that there really is war among the gods, and terrible enmities and battles, and other such things as are told by the poets, and other sacred stories such as are embroidered by good writers and by representations of which the robe of the goddess is adorned when it is carried up to the Acropolis? Are we to say these things are true, Euthyphro? Euthyphro: Not only these, Socrates, but, as I was saying just now, I will, if you wish, relate many other things about the gods which I know will amaze you. Socrates: I should not be surprised, but you will tell me these at leaisure some other time. For now, try to tell me more clearly what I was asking just now, for, my friend, you did not teach me adequately when I asked you what the pious was, but you told me that what you are doing now, prosecuting your father for murder, is pious. Euthyphro: And I told the truth, Socrates. Socrates: Perhaps. You agree, however, that there are many other pious actions. Euthyphro: There are. Socrates: Bear in mind then that I did not bid you tell me one or two of the many pious actions but that form itself that makes all pious actions pious, for you agreed that all impious actions are impious and all pious actions pious through one form, or don't you remember? Euthyphro: I do. Socrates: Tell me then what this form itself is, so that I may look upon it, and using it as a model, say that any action of yours or another's that is of that kind is pious, and if it is not that it is not. Euthyphro: If that is how you want it, Socrates, that is how I will tell you. Socrates: That is what I want. Euthyphro: Well then, what is dear to the gods is pious, what is not is impious. Socrates: Splendid, Euthyphro! You have now answered in the way I wanted. Whether your answer is true I do not know yet, but you will obviously show me that what you say is true. Euthyphro: Certainly. Socrates: Come then, let us examine what we mean. An action or a man dear to the gods is pious, but an action or a man hated by the gods is impious. They are not the same, but quite opposite, the pious and the impious. Is that not so? Euthyphro: It is indeed. Socrates: And that seems to be a good statement? Euthyphro: I think so, Socrates. Socrates: We have also stated that the gods are in a state of discord, that they are at odds with each other, Euthyphro, and that they are at enmity with each other. Has that, too, been said? Euthyphro: It has. Socrates: What are the subjects of difference that cause hatred and anger? Let us look at it this way. If you and I were to differ about numbers as to which is the greater, would this difference make us enemies and angry with each other, or would we proceed to cound and soon resolve our difference about this? Euthyphro: We should certainly do so. Socrates: Again, if we differed about the larger and the smaller, we would turn to measurement and soon cease to differ. Euthyphro: Of course. Socrates: What subject of difference would make us angry and hostile to each other if we were anable to come to a decision? Perhaps you do not have an answer ready, but examine as I tell you whether these subjects are the just and the unjust, the beautiful and the ugly, the good and the bad. Are these not the subjects of difference about which, when we are unable to come to a satisfactory decision, you and I and other men become hostile to each other whenever we do? Euthyphro: That is the difference, Socrates, about those subjects. Socrates: What about the gods, Euthyphro? If indeed they have differences, will it not be about these same subjects? Euthyphro: It certainly must be so. Socrates: Then according to your argument, my good Euthyphro, different gods consider different things to be just, beautiful, ugly, good, and bad, for they would not be at odds with one another unless they differed about these subjects, would they? Euthyphro: You are right. Socrates: And they like what each of them considers beautiful, good, and just, and hate the opposites of these? Euthyphro: Certainly. Socrates: But you say that the same things are considered just by some gods and unjust by others, and as they dispute about these things they are at odds with each other. Is that not so? Euthyphro: It is. Socrates: The same things then are loved by the gods and hated by the gods, and would be both god-loved and god-hated. Euthyphro: It seems likely. Socrates: And the same things would be both pious and impious, according to this argument? Euthyphro: I'm afraid so. Socrates: So you did not answer my question, you suprising man. I did not ask you what the same thing is both pious and impious, and it appears that what is loved by the gods is also hated by them. So it is in no way surprising if your present action, namely punishing your father, my be pleasing to Zeus but displeasing to Kronos and Ouranos, pleasing to Hephaestus but displeasing to Hera, and so with any other gods who differ from each other on this subject. Euthyphro: I think, Socrates, that on this subject no gods would differ from one another, that whoever has killed anyone unjustly should pay the penalty. Socrates: Well now, Euthyphro, have you ever heard any man maintaining that one who has killed or done anything else unjustly should not pay the penalty? Euthyphro: They never cease to dispute on this subject, both elsewhere and in the courts, for when they have committed many wrongs the do and say anything to avoid the penalty. Socrates: Do they agree they have done wrong, Eughyphro, and in spite of so agreeing do tehy nevertheless say they should not be punished? Euthyphro: No, they do not agree on that point. Socrates: So they do not say or do anything. For they do not venture to say this, or dispute that they must not pay the penalty if they have done wrong, but I think they deny doing wrong. Is that not so? Euthyphro: That is true. Socrates: Then they do not dispute that the wrongdoer must be punished, but they may disagree as to who the wrongdoer is, what he did and when. Euthyphro: You are right. Socrates: Do not the gods have the same experience, if indeed they are at odds with each other about the just and unjust, as your argument maintains? Some assert that they wrong one another, while others deny it, but no one among gods or men ventures to say that the wrongdoer must not be punished. Euthyphro: Yes, indeed. Socrates: Come now, my dear Euthyphro, tell me, too, that I may become wiser, what proof you have that all the gods consider that man to have been killed unjustly who bacame a murderer while in your service, was bound by the master of his victim, and died in his bonds before the one who bound him found out from the seers what was to be done with him, and that it is right for a son to denounce and to prosecute his father on behalf of such a man. Come, try to show me a clear sign that all the gods definitely believe this action to be right. If you can give me adequate proff of this, I shall never cease to extol your wisdom. Euthyphro: This is perhaps no light task, Socrates, though I could show you very clearly. Socrates: I understand that you think me more dull-witted than the jury,as you will obviously show them that these actions were unjust and that all the gods hate such actions. Euthyphro: I will show it to them clearly, Socrates, if only they will listen to me. Socrates: They will listen if they think you show them well. But this thought came to me as you were speaking, and I am examining it, saying to myself: "If Euthyphro shows me conclusively that all the gods consider such a death unjust, to what greater extent have I learned from him the nature of piety and impiety? This action would tehn, it seems, be hated by the gods, but the pious and the impious were not thereby now defined, for what is hated by the gods has also been shown to be loved by them." So I will not insist on this point; let us assume, if you wish, that all the gods consider this unjust and that they all hate it. However, is this the correction we are making in our discussion, that what all the gods hate is impious, and what they all love is pious, and that what some gods love and others hate is neither or both? Is that how you now wish us to define piety and impiety? Euthyphro: What prevents us from doing so, Socrates? Socrates: For my part nothing, Euthyphro, but you look whether on your part this proposal will enable you to teach me most easily what you promised. Euthyphro: I would certainly say that the pious is what all the gods love, and the opposite, what all the gods hate, is the impious. Socrates: Then let us again examine whether that is a sound statement, or do we let it pass, and if one of us, or someonelse, merely says that something is so, do we accept that it is so? Or should we examine what the speaker means? Euthyphro: We must examine it, but I certainly think that this is now a fine statement. Socrates: We shall soon know whether it is. Consider this: Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods? Euthyphro: I don't know what you mean, Socrates. Socrates: I shall try to explain more clearly: we speak of something being carried and something carrying, of something being led and something leading, of something being seen and something seeing, and you understand that these things are all different from one another and how they differ? Euthyphro: I think I ido. Socrates: So there is being loved and something loving, and the loving is a different thing. Euthyphro: Of course. Socrates: Tell me then whether that which is being carried is being carried because someone carries it or for some other reason. Euthyphro: No, that is the reason. Socrates: And that which is led is so because someone leads it, and that which is being seen because someone sees it? Euthyphro: Certainly. Socrates: It is not seen by someone because it is being seen but on the contrary it is being seen because someone sees it, nor is it because it is being led that someone leads it but because someone leads it that it is being led; nor does someone carry an object because it is being carried, but it is being carried because someone carries it. Is what I want to say clear, Euthyphro? I want to say this, namely, that if anything comes to be, or is affected, it does not come to be because it is coming to be, but it is coming to be because it comes to be; nor is it affected because it is being affected but because something affects it. Or do you not agree? Euthyphro: I do. Socrates: What is being loved is either something that comes to be or something that is affected by something? Euthyphro: Certainly. Socrates: So it is in the same case as the things just mentioned; it is not loved by those who love it because it is being loved, but it is being loved because they love it? Euthyphro: Necessarily. Socrates: What then do we say about the pious, Euthyphro? Surely that it is loved by all the gods, according to what you say? Euthyphro: Yes. Socrates: Is it loved because it is pious, or for some other reason? Euthyphro: For no other reason. Socrates: It is loved because it is pious, but it is not pious because it is loved? Euthyphro: Apparently. Socrates: And because it is loved by the gods it is being loved and is dear to the gods? Euthyphro: Of course. Socrates: The god-beloved is then not the same as the pious, Euthyphro, nor the pious the same as the god-beloved, as you say it is, but one differs from the other. Euthyphro: How so, Socrates? Socrates: Because we agree that the pious is beloved for the reason that it is pious, but it is not pious because it is loved. Is that not so? Euthyphro: Yes. Socrates: And that the god-beloved, on the other hand, is so because it is loved by the gods, by the very fact of being loved, but it is not loved because it is god-beloved. Euthyphro: True. Socrates: But if the god-beloved and the pious were the same, my dear Euthyphro, and the pious were loved because it was pious, then the god-beloved would be loved because it was loved by the gods, then the pious would also be pious because it was loved by the gods; but now you see that they are in opposite cases as being altogether different from each other: the one is of a nature to be loved because it is loved, the other is loved because it is of a nature to be loved. I’m afraid, Euthyphro, that when you were asked what piety is, you did not wish to make its nature clear to me, but you told me an affect or quality of it, that the pious has the quality of being loved by all the gods, but you have not yet told me what the pious is. Now, if you will, do not hide things from me but tell me again from the beginning what piety is, whether loved by the gods or having some other quality – we shall not quarrel about that – but be keen to tell me what the pious and the impious are. 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